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**Theme case:**

**Bill Clinton's Post-Cold war Foreign Policies in Bosnia and Somalia**

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## ***Dedications***

*To My Mother, Father, and my family, thank you for supporting me throughout my studies. Your encouragement has made it possible for me to come this far and to write about what I am passionate about. I dedicate this work to you.*

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### **Abstract**

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Bill Clinton's foreign policies in Somalia and Bosnia in the post-Cold War world, with particular focus on his Vision for the U.S. Role in the post-Cold War World. In order to achieve this goal, the study used a historical approach to track the key issues. Order was defined through how he could guide, shape, direct, and manage American foreign policy in midst of drastic changes, and looks at how decisions were reached in the House and Senate. The study aims to test whether Clinton succeeded in directing and managing the change to serve American interests which offered a semblance of order for American foreign policy in a sea of international disorder.

**Key words:** Clinton, foreign policy, Somalia, Bosnia, America

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## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

IFOR International Implementation Force (Bosnia)

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NSC National Security Council

NWO New World Order

SNA Somalia National Alliance

UN United Nations

UNITAF United Task Force Somalia

UNOSOM UN Operation in Somalia

UNPE UN Peace Enforcement

BiH Bosnia-Herzegovina

UNPROFOR UN Protection Force (Bosnia)

UNSC UN Security Council

## **General Introduction**

Post-Cold War is described as the era that took place in the early 1990s that has an impact on international relations. Bill Clinton's foreign policies marked a significant shift in American ones, by which, America had to find a new global function, and can lead effective military forces, as far as, that was the first primarily humanitarian use of force in modern U.S history. Thus, Clinton's contradicted views and interest in intervening in both Somalia and Bosnia with his predecessor president George H. W. Bush coerced him to steer his intention towards demonstrating his foreign policies to maintain leadership over Somalia and Bosnia and protecting US interests.

Moreover, Somalia presented the first opportunity for post-Cold War, American Military intervention. Not Even a year into the post-Cold War era, and with mere weeks remaining in his tenure, President George H. W. Bush ordered the deployment of American Combat forces to Somalia to secure the Somali Trade routes and facilitate the flow of food and medical supplies to the Somali people. Despite Bush's Assurance that this would not be an "open-ended commitment," the timing of the deployment effectively left Bill Clinton's Administration in charge of the operation.

More often than not, as was the case with Bill Clinton's post-Cold War foreign policies in Bosnia and Somalia. Considering that Bill Clinton was the first true post-Cold War president, his time in office gave him the opportunity to offer a direction in American international affairs different than his predecessors. The researcher argues that American Foreign policy in Bosnia represents a break from this trend. Bosnia offered the U S. Policy makers no promise for commercial capital gain, nor did they fabricate a reason to unilaterally intervene. The researcher make the case that Clinton entered office with a more encompassing vision for U.S. Foreign relations than that of his predecessor.



With this brief introduction in mind, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze what significant factors finally motivated President Clinton to respond with military force after years of indecisiveness to the crisis in BiH and Somalia. The study will not elaborate completely on how the U.S. forces were deployed or fulfilled their military objectives. The concerns in this study are neither BiH nor Somalia, nor the rights and wrongs of particular sides of the violent conflicts. It aims instead to shed light on the decision-making processes by which the U.S.' policies on Somalia and later Bosnia were made and the calculation underlying them. The major focus is on Clinton's administrations, the corridors of power where decisions were made or ignored, and the pushing and pulling of Washington's intense bureaucratic struggles. Most importantly, demonstrate how Clinton's vision for the U.S. role in the post-Cold War World differed markedly from that of his predecessor George H. W. Bush. The detailed examination of these decision-making processes will reveal a number of factors which can be found in the U.S. governments' policy processes. However, to narrow the scope, the questions guiding this thesis are:

1. To what extent did Clinton's policies effect the American government?
2. Was Bosnia an American foreign policy success?
3. How did the American foreign policies influence the other governments from the post-cold war till the time being?

To test the validity of the hypothesis, the two main crises in which US troops were deployed during the first Clinton administration- Somalia (1992-94), and Bosnia (1991-95)- are investigated.

1. Clinton's decisions to interfere to Bosnia marked a significant shift in American Foreign Policy through a distinct vision of his predecessors.

2. The administration is notably silent on the question of ever indicting President Milosevic.
3. Clinton's ideology towards stability and peace in Bosnia and Somalia required a European support.

The reason that Somalia and Bosnia were all involve in humanitarian catastrophe, because, they are in regions of minimal security interest, and have a victim-perpetrator characteristic that could feasibly have been checked by decisive US action. As they led to the deployment of troops.

The sources used in this thesis are mixture of primary and secondary elements: public and government documents, speeches, notes, congressional testimonies, biographies, memoirs, and academic articles and books. The analysis places a special importance on public documents, speeches and statements made by senior officials before and during the review process. Additionally, the memoirs of President George H. Bush, President Bill Clinton, Secretary Madeleine Albright, Secretary Warren Christopher, General Colin Powell have been of importance in understanding their roles and reasoning for their actions in these political-military endeavors. Their memoirs have been weighed against other sources.

On the other hand, numerous documents which could have provided even profounder insight into the processes leading up to President Clinton's final decisions remain classified by the U.S. Government. This lack of access to such documents might lessen the vision and exactness of some parts of this thesis. It has been almost impossible to find documents that could provide extensive knowledge about Slobodan Milosevic's goals and plans. Milosevic was the type of politician who left no traces. He never wrote articles under his name and his short speeches contained no plans. He never held a press conference. However, based on the

extensive number of different sources used, the researcher is quite confident that the following accounts are knowledgeable, precise, and hopefully convincing.

This research paper is organized in MLA 8th edition style format. I have chosen these given works specifically to deal with two Muslim regions Somalia and Bosnia, because, it's better to make a connection between your interests and the inherent issues of the subject. The researcher let his cultural background prompt him toward detailed research into his heritage, his culture, and the mythology of his ethnic Muslim background, it relies on the Historical, the narrative and the argumentative tools. The historical and the narrative method are used to give the autobiography of Bill Clinton and how he rose to power. I used the argumentative approach to test the credibility of Clinton's success in winning in his foreign policy alongside the American public.

Structurally, this research consists of three chapters. Chapter one is devoted to definitions and explanations. The Thesis begins with a short historiography of the Clinton Presidency followed by a brief history of the George H. Bush New World Order concept. And Then presents a comprehensive description of Clinton's Vision for the U.S. In the post-Cold War world, and how he used the new order in his Somalia, Bosnia interventions. The decision to stall on troop deployments to Bosnia was arguably influenced by the Somalia crisis. The following explains how the cases approach the examination of congressional foreign policy in relation to the reassessment of the US's contribution to 1990s humanitarian conflict resolution.

Chapter two discusses America's 1992-94 intervention into the Somalia crisis It first encompasses the background of the Somalia crisis. Also, it explains that UNITAF (United Task Forces Somalia) was a chance to operationalise UNPE (UN Peace enforcement) as a foreign policy doctrine and the second part focuses on the impact of the deaths of eighteen US troops on the commitment to UNPE. It argues that the mission may have ended

ignominiously, and impelled Clinton to proclaim a more cautious stance that would prevent interventions slipping into nation-building. the chapter examines voting cues on floor votes relating to the Somalia crisis.

Chapter three traces the process towards the December 1995 IFOR (International Implementation Force) deployment to Bosnia. It gives a background to the Yugoslav crisis; the chapter then focuses on 1995 because this was the year when the administration concluded that only a meaningful threat of military force would check Serb aggression. Also, to support the case for an assertive Congress, the section argues that the decision to launch a NATO(North Atlantic treaty Organisation) peacekeeping, and, crucially following on from this, Clinton Finally acquired the political means to overcome each of these obstacles and remained devoted to his vision of America's Role in the post-Cold War world.

## **Chapter One: Historical Background**

For over 40 years, the Cold War structured America's foreign policy space as a rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union, categorized as much by a war of difference of opinion, as by physical confrontation. As a consequence, Cold War alignment lost meaning. President H. W. Bush, Clinton's predecessor, brought back the phrase "New World Order". His speech focuses on the soviet-American relations and he was quoted as saying "ultimately, Our objective is to welcome the Soviet Union back into the world order. So, the end of the Cold War proved to be a significant shift period in the history of foreign affairs, President Clinton's entrance in the White House overlaps with one of the definitive turning points in modern history. Considering that, he was the first true post-cold war president, an era described as an international context where the central pillar now changes, he took office with a new expanded vision for America's position in the world. Clinton held that the United States was European power, whose existence was vital to preserve stability and peace. Consequently, this chapter explain how Bush's "New World Order" became Clinton's "New World Order", and look at how Clinton set his priorities to lead America in post-Cold War era.

### **1.1 Historiography**

The Americans felt forced to defend their soil and expend their presence after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. This became even clearer after the World War 2, when the Soviet Union posted itself as American rivalry. United States foreign policy, from the founding of the republic, has relied on a resort to power. In the late 1790s, President John Adams waged an undeclared naval war against France, followed by Thomas Jefferson's order of spreading navy and marines to deal with Ottoman and Maghreb pirates. Furthermore, in 1818 Andrew Jackson was given informal sanction to conduct an expedition into Spanish Florida.

Americans, concerned with fulfilling their Manifest Destiny, for the most part ignored the outside world. Conflicts, when they did come, were aimed at expanding the new republic's frontiers. As the demise of the cold war, the United States now has the luxury to be more selective in where it chooses to intervene. Bill Clinton a shining president whose era was described as never static. After taking power and following the footsteps of his predecessor 's concept "the new world order" George Bush. In addition, how he managed to shape The United States' post-cold war military involvement in places as varied as, Somalia, Bosnia.

In his book "The United Nations and the New World", Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Anthony Clark Arend argued that Bush New World Order refers to a promise of military involvement in order to salvage American interest abroad (Arend 233). So, the prime interest in military interventions is seeking self-serving, in this case Alexander Hamilton one of the founding fathers of the United States, known for his clever ideas for setting the foundation of George Washington's administration, saw that, in order to the executive authority to be strong, one power must take the leadership. Furthermore, a starting point of Clinton's policy to Bush's 1990-1993 "new world order" is a reference to his predecessor, as will be argued, continuity is evident. In a journal editorial article Indyk claims:

Like other aspect of the Clinton presidency, authors are divided with the respect of motivations that guided Clinton's foreign policy decisions; most focus on one of three. Some try to convince their audience that Clinton was motivated by a genuine desire to do good and make the post-Post-Cold War world a more peaceful place. Others argue that Clinton's desire was a selfish quest for personal or politic gain. Most argue that Clinton was concerned with his legacy-how history would remember his years in office- and his foreign

policy decisions reflected a desire to have history remember him kindly (Indyk).

William Jefferson Clinton, remarkably climbed to the presidency. In spite, painful childhood that he had, having had never knowing his father and being raised by his vicious stepfather (Berman 17-18). Furthermore, Berman William a well credential American historian stresses the event that turned Bill's life is, his shaking hands with the deceased president John F. Kennedy, who was an idol to him (20). Despite the spinning facts and the concept of old solution could not solve new problems. Bosnia and Somalia provided Clinton the ground for his vision.

Bosnia was Clinton's selection because he wanted to take a different approach considering the issue from George. H. W. Bush's approach. Moreover he kept his promise of intervening in Bosnia by military force, following his believe when Europe is safe America is safer (Clinton 1993). However, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell refused to accept any military action in Bosnia, he further added that he is committed to his policy to not risk American Lives, because he saw no American interest in danger (The New York Times 1995). According to an article written by David Lauter, Clinton wanted to avoid mistakes by delaying most of his foreign policy, including the emerging dilemma in Somalia, that was left hanging by the Bush's administration, to test the new president's vision (Lauter 1993).

Ryan C, Hendrickson an assistant professor of political Science stated in his book "The Clinton Wars", that the mission to Somalia had a great shame of the United States and Clinton in particular, considering that it his real first foreign policy (Ryan 20). He further added that Clinton position were very similar to president Bush's prior stance; he aligned himself to the new world order by keeping peace in the region (33).

### 1.1.1 New World Order

As this dissertation examines the foreign policies of Bill Clinton after the demise of the Cold War, and starting a new era, it is necessary to explain the roots of the peace interventions origins and defend its credibility as a foreign policy tool. In tracing its origins, and, citing President George H. W. Bush's 'new world order' speeches. What could be seen as Clinton's version of the NOW was based on the US forming international alliances to reinforce effort to uphold peace and security.

Bush borrowed the "new world order" from Gorbachev, who had used it before to describe the role of the United nations in keeping peace and harboring security internationally (Foreign policy 2017). Historian Walter Mills, maintained that prior to World War 1, colonel Edward House, the major adviser to Woodrow Wilson, the president at that time, had a hidden motive for involving America in the war. Walter wrote: "The Colonel's sole justification for preparing such a batch for blood for his countrymen was his hope of establishing a new world order of peace and security" (Hudnell 80). In addition, the idea that Yugoslavia embodied an anarchy surrounding the Bosnian War, because Bush's administration kept a distance regarding the war, to make the European leaders embrace the new world order. Not to mention, that president Eisenhower paved the way for America to expand oversea and search for new world order through his farewell address:

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research-these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in



itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we which to travel (ourdocuments).

In conjunction with, David Hendrickson a teacher of international politics and American foreign policy, said that, Clinton signed on the idea of “new world order “ and run after a more significantly ambition agenda, that his policy was as similar as Bush’s (Hendrickson 1-5). Furthermore, Clinton was elected in 1992, that presidential election would be about creating new world order. Clinton nonetheless signaled support for United States involvement in peace operations. He criticised Bush during the campaign for not doing enough to prevent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. President Clinton told UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali that he would find a good troop contributing nation.

According to Clinton, America’s mission was humanitarian as the United States wished it to be, to help people of Somalia. Because of the intervention of US armies progress has been made, Schools re-opened, food grew, life returned to normal. Hence, the negative agenda of the enemy were buried by the US positive attitude toward the issue, but looking through a narrow glass, Clinton justified his interventions as peace keeping mission that the United states of America is willing to achieve. Richard Cherwitz and Kenneth Zagacki (1986) noted, ”whether or not presidents take military action, the very act to use fervor to rally public opinion around a central enemy” (318). Consequently, Clinton’s presented a scene similar to new world order concept, where he sets the rules and criteria shaped in ”Us against Them” ,referring to whom seek to destroy the strive for democracy, peace, and freedom.

Successively, Bush’s last act was to leaving a letter for his Democratic successor, the man who defeated him. Although, Bush’s contention campaign against Mr. Clinton that denied him a second term. He said” Your success now is our country’s success,” he wrote. “I

am rooting hard for you. “So, the road to the oval office for Clinton had just began. A venture to serve the United State, nobly, and graciously.

### **1.1.2 Bill Clinton’s Rise to Power:**

Bill Clinton rose to power, apparently, at a crucial stage in the history of the United States and the world. Assuming office at more challenging times after the collapse of Communism, being the 42<sup>nd</sup> president of The United States, from 1993 to 2001. Prior to that, Arkansas governor. He was the president after the Cold-War, during his time, America enjoyed an era of peace and prosperity, and the holding of energy, and commitment to overhauling American foreign policy in the post-Cold war world.

Clinton was born William Jefferson Blyth on August 19, 1946, in Hope Arkansas, the only child of Virginia Cassidy Blyth. Berman narrated in his book “from the center to the edge: The Politics and Policies of the Clinton Presidency”, Clinton’s winning the Rhodes scholarship ,as a result he went to Oxford University (Berman 6). Upon his return from England he enrolled to Yale School, where he met with his next to be spouse Hillary Rodham. In addition, his enthusiasm and extreme ambition and skills were put in demonstration while running his first race for public office, where he nearly defeated a longtime Republican Congressman in 1974 (Berman 15).

As several of his biographers have noted, Clinton’s years as governor exposed political and effective characters that would later carry over to his presidency. For example, when Clinton was elected governor for the first time in 1978, he canvassed as a reasonable progressive, seeking modest changes in the tax structure. Berman further added that surprisingly, in his first days as a high school student, he had a strong emotional bond with black Americans. As a young man he attended black churches. Alongside his relations, politicians reported that he was neither a trustworthy nor a reliable, because the promises that he said he would keep, but didn’t (Berman 15).

In many respects, he was the first Democrat to be elected to a second term since Franklin D. Roosevelt and the one who balanced the budget in three decades, appointing a number of women and minorities to top government posts. Donald T. Phillips, described Clinton as “a lightning rod for hate, ridicule, and opposition, he was the target of an endless series of attacks perpetrated by a well-organized and well-funded group of political enemies” (Phillips 3-4). Moreover, Phillips asserted Clinton’s personal magnetism was the reason he was “loved and loathed” to extremes. Clinton possessed an uncanny ability to charm people, superb communication skills, and talent in connecting with others- emotionally, intellectually, and physically (Phillips 3-4).

According to the article entitled as “Bill Clinton”, after winning the Democratic presidential nomination in 1992, Clinton, along with vice-president nominee Al Gore, a US senator to defeat the unavoidable, President George H. Bush by a margin of 43 percent of popular to Bush’s 37,5 percent of the vote (History). As a result, Clinton inauguration in January 1993 at age 46, making him the third youngest president in history up to that time.

Gradually, like other features of the Clinton presidency, authors were disconnected regarding the motivation that guided Clinton’s foreign decision; most focus on one of three. Some tried to convince their audience that Clinton was inspired by an honest desire to do good and make the post-Cold-War world more peaceful place. Others argued that Clinton’s desires were selfish aiming for personal and political gain. Most argued that he was concerned with his legacy; how history would remember his years in office; and how his administration reacted towards his foreign policy decisions.

## **1.2 Bill Clinton Administration**

“I will give you an administration that look like America”

Clinton campaign Promise

May 11, 1992

William Jefferson Clinton, a rather unfamiliar governor of the state of Arkansas, he appeared as a political intellect. Soon after he came across many issues, this challenge posed the greatest challenge to Clinton's vision of the U. S in post-Cold-War, Through Bush out of office, there still many who shared his narrow, Cold-War era view of foreign policy. Paradoxically, in the aftermath of the Clinton presidency, this task provides a relative analysis of the Clinton administration used of his views and interest, and a wide perception of the post-Cold-War era. Simultaneously, the structures of the national security were ambiguous. What now can seem to constituted the United States national security interests? Who was the military threat?

Keeping the same line of thought, Hendrickson pointed out in his Book "The Clinton Wars", that in the midst of Clinton presidency, NATO was authorized for the first time to intervene in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, since its creation in 1949 (Hendrickson 241).

Hendrickson further explained, that the essential part of the United Nations on President Clinton's foreign policy has led to more complication of war powers responsibilities. Clinton gained the approval he needed from the United Nations Security Council to deploy American troops in Somalia and Bosnia (8). A discovery is to be made concerning the theme in Bill Clinton's foreign Policies regarding the interventions on Bosnia, as well as, Somalia in the post-Cold-War era. Plus, identify his views and interest regarding the issues.

### **1.2.1 Post-Cold War as a Context**

When the Soviet Union collapsed, there were a number of political analysts who debated what the post-Cold War world would be like? Francis Fukuyama was one of the first. Fukuyama famously argued that the United States entered a post-Cold War environment he called "the end of history." He reasoned that liberal democracy and free markets triumphed

over their communist rivals. As a result, it would lead to increased interdependence and mixing, economic prosperity, and generally more freedom within the global environment. Certainly, there would be crashes along the way, but the progress toward democracy and free markets were an unavoidable logic that all nations would come to eventually adopt. To understand this argument. First concerning post-Cold-War as a context help to understand the exceptionality of American mission. Second to explore Clinton perception of the era. Here, Clinton, used a series of historical analogies which, reinforced his argument that the United States must continue to lead.

According to William F. Jasper, an American writer on conspiracy theories, the identity crisis of the 1990s in American foreign policy developed in three distinguishable phases. The first of these phases began with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and lasted through the first few months of President Clinton's tenure in the White House in 1993. During this decisive period, both the realists and the idealists sought to establish primacy in influence over the course of American foreign relations by outlining their visions of the future as well as their readings of the past. Realists saw the end of the Cold War severely as a strategic victory leading to a world fraught with complex problems, while idealists heralded the collapse of communism as an ideological conquest and the dawn of a new peace (Jesper 40). The height of this first stage of the identity crisis was the election of 1992, during which these issues received substantial devotion on the national and international stage. President George H.W. Bush and then Governor Bill Clinton deliberated American foreign policy from their fixed positions as a realist and a liberal internationalist, respectively. Clinton's victory at the polls in November of 1992 signaled an end to the Cold War. A War practiced by the Bush administration.

Furthermore, this examines how Clinton "invented" arguments for U.S. foreign policy. As the first true post-Cold War president, Clinton presided over one of the key transition

periods in the history of American foreign affairs. (the USS Cole 17), along with the fact that Clinton presided over a key transition period, makes our 42nd president a pivotal figure in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy. According to Clinton's speechwriter Michael Waldman speaking at American University in 1993, the president reflected the most racial tension occurring by observing:

Look now at our new immigrant Nation and think of the world, which we are tending. Look at how diverse and multiethnic and multilingual we are, in a world in which the ability to communicate with all kinds of people from all over the world and to understand them will be critical. Look at our civic habits of tolerance and respect. They are not perfect in our own eyes. It grieved us all when there was so much trouble a year ago in Los Angeles. But Los Angeles is a country with 150 different ethnic groups of widely differing levels of education and access to capital and income. It is a miracle that we get along as well as we do. And all you have to do is look at Bosnia, where differences were not so great, to see how well we have done in spite of our difficulties (Public Papers of the President of the United States 1993).

Consequently, it is necessary to introduce the crisis in Somalia as an example of what to be discussed later on as it had been the first issue Clinton's administration faced. It can be argued that the crisis in Mogadishu created, during the 1990s, was in many respects the same as Vietnam issue, public opinion and congressional made the commitment of U.S. troops a political possibility. Clinton attempted to keep the United States out of a leadership role and away from engaging in actively stopping the crimes in many places. It represents an excellent opportunity to understand how Clinton approached, and what are his views and interests.

### **1.2.2 President Clinton's Views and Interest**

When Bill Clinton took his inaugural oath, he had two major changes. First, he moved into a position that was vastly different from his prior experience as governor of Arkansas. Second, he had inherited a foreign policy chance with operation allowing to help people who were starving. In Clinton's view, traditional power politics was an insufficient guide to meet post-Cold War era. There was an indication that Clinton would give more intention to human rights in U.S. foreign policy and a potential of solving crisis and conflicts of the world. Presumably, the Somalia mission fit into the foreign policy goal, alongside with Bosnia as his second foreign policy. However, as with any new president, there was still uncertainty about how Clinton would conduct foreign policy once in the White House. Much uncertainty persisted concerning the level to which Congress would seek to influence the policy in the post-Cold War era

In a speech delivered at American university on February 26, 1993 President Clinton argued:

.... we must update our definition of national security and to promote it and to protect it and to foster democracy and human rights around the world.... our leadership is especially important for the world's new and emerging democracies. To grow and deepen their legitimacy, to foster a middle class and a civic culture, they need the ability to tap into a growing global economy. And our security and our prosperity will be greatly affected in the years ahead by how many of these nations can become and stay democracies (Directives).

According to the 1992 intelligence report, indicating that the Europeans had not enforced the U.N. sanction against Serbia adequately. The report detailed; the sanctions accused that though the sanctions did hurt the Serbian economy. "loopholes and violations of the UN sanctions regime have allowed Serbia and Montenegro continued access to energy and

key industrial imports” (Balkans 1992).As a result, Clinton announced his policy toward the former Yugoslavia. As consequence, the UK welcomed the new American initiative. Clinton argued in his memoirs: “I had to consider the consequence of any action that could make it even harder to get congressional support for sending American troops to Bosnia” (B. Clinton).

Somalia became the first American military intervention solely for humanitarian purposes. Madeleine K. Albright, a U.S. secretary of state argued that with U.S humanitarian intervention in Somalia. President Clinton learnt from his ten months in the White House. On May 4, 1993, the command of the U.S. forces in Somalia was passed without any congressional complaints (Albright). In his memoirs, Bill Clinton described the strong reaction from Senators Robert Byrd and John McCain. Both demanded that Clinton should get the troops out of Somalia, although the relentless pressure by the congress Somalia, a country outward to United States interest, and the forces had been withdrawn till March 31, 1994 (40).

As the discussions at the beginning of this chapter show, Clinton used his predecessor concept to enter the new world order for foreign policy purposes to a far greater extent than most previous presidents relatively speaking, one finds that this is very much evident in his use of executive orders. Thus, the assumption presented in chapter one of presidents using tools to maintain his the Bipolar and save American place in the world, Finally, Clinton’s foreign policy constitutes different aspects of foreign policy thinking as reflected in the American society. Eventually Clinton’s promotion of democracy together with the importance of geopolitical interests and his hesitant to get engaged in U.N. in Somalia and the moves of the congress, as we shall see in the next chapter.



## **Chapter two: The President and Congress Intervention in Somalia**

Chapter two introduces the American engagement in the UN operation in Somalia to investigate the role of Congress in post-Cold War foreign policy making. It further explains the origin of the Somalia crisis, and It defines Clinton's UNPE approach, argues that it was intended as a serious conflict resolution model. In particular, America's experience in Somalia shows evidence that Congress is not deferential towards the president in foreign policy. Lawmakers originally pressured Bush to act to divert the famine, and then forced Clinton to evacuate the troops after the October 3 disaster in Mogadishu. After looking at the institutional level, the chapter examines voting cues on floor votes relating to the Somalia crisis and emphasis on how Congress at the institutional level impacted on foreign policy decision making ignores much about how lawmakers reach collective decisions.

### **2.1 The Crisis in Somalia**

Somali represented President Clinton's first real foreign policy test and crisis. Throughout the 1980s, president Said Barre rose hostility of the clans, which led to extensive violence. The inevitable civil war between militia forces linked to various warlords and Barre's troops rushed the country into a state of anarchism. Growing threat of starvation wasn't dealt with properly, due to deficiency of food supplies. By October 1993, the mission was a deep embarrassment for the United states. for more broadened, an understanding for the crisis, a historical background of the Somalia situation will be discussed.

In his book "Transatlantic Security from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa", Dr Kizito Sabala, said that, the President of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, Siad Barre, was removed from power in 1991. The fall of his regime led to a breakdown of law and order in Somalia. Deterioration of the Somalian society into civil conflict and chaos was confusing for

some spectators since Somalia is one of the few standardized states in Africa with a common language, a common culture and a single religion, Islam (Kizito 141). Unlike nearly all the new states of Africa, Somalia was a ‘nation’, before it became a state. argued Laitin David, an expert in comparative politics, (Laitin).

He further mentioned, that most Western states believed that a model of democratic process is started in Somalia after the decolonization with the changes in government founded on elections. But many Somalis perceive themselves very differently. The modern state is damaged and many political arrangements were made continuously to boost “clan power”. Where some Western spectators saw democracy, many Somalis saw “exploitation, tribalism, indecisiveness and stagnation (Merip Reports).

Academics like Hook and Spanier, argued that during the Cold War, Somalia played a part in the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Under the dictator General Siad Barre, Somalia was aligned with the Soviet Union while the neighboring Ethiopia was allied with the U.S. In a switch that can only make sense in the context of the Cold War, both states switched allegiances, making the ruthless Barre a friend of the U.S (Hook and Spanier 223). In 1977, Barre initiated a war against Ethiopia, which led to the ending of Western aid for his state and forced him to become progressively repressive to maintain control over rival clans. In regards to Barre’s supporters, who turned on him and riots ensued, Barre was forced to flee Somalia in January 1991. Ethnic tensions between clans caused war between rival warlords who were now competing for control of the state in the absence of Barre (S. Army Center for Military History 1994).

In a publication entitled, “Missed Opportunities”, Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat, reasoned that the first diplomat dispatched to Mogadishu by the United Nations’ Secretary General Boutros Ghali after the outbreak of hostilities in the country in 1992, the international public missed three opportunities to intervene in the Somali crisis prior to the

collapse of the state in 1991. The first of these missed opportunities was the government's violent response to the uprising in the Northwest in May of 1988, wherein which the government used aircraft and heavy weapons in a bloody effort to suppress the civilian population (M. Sahnoun). Mr. Sahnoun expressed that one "would expect that in the absence of a democratic mechanism allowing for corrective measures, the international community would come to the rescue of the victimized population. It did not and this represents the first of the missed opportunities" (M. O. Sahnoun).

The second missed opportunity according to Ambassador Sahnoun, happened in May 1990, precisely two years after the beginning of the revolution in the North and as armed hostility spread to other areas of the country, a Manifesto calling for a national conference to resolve the various movements and clans. The group blamed the government for the slaughters committed during the revolution, and called for a shared system, constitutional changes. The response of Siyad Barre's government was to capture many of the Manifesto's parties, including a former president of Somalia, Adam Abdullah Osman (c-span 2019).

According to a manifesto of Security Council. By 1992, the fighting had killed 15,000 people and inhibited the delivery of food supplies. The United Nation Security Council replied by launching UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia). Due to this unproductive response, Congress pushed Bush into lifting supplies. (Jeffrey Clark). Bush's purpose was not to nation-build, but to halt a humanitarian catastrophe. The Gulf War factors inspired the Bush's administration to talk about a "new world order". in which America would lead peacekeeping forces in defense of global human rights.

In addition to the above-mentioned events. There was also a turning point when 18 US soldiers were killed in a single engagement. US troops were as John Robert Bolton an American attorney, political commentator stressed that, soldiers outnumbered by the local forces. After this event, the observation of US failure was spread to both the world and the US

public. Many in Congress wanted an instant or near-term withdrawal of US forces (Bolton). However, according to Richard N. Haass, an American diplomat, that on October 7, 1993, Clinton announced a new Policy: the US would intensify its marines in and around Somalia for a period of 6 months. At the end of that time, all US forces would be withdrawn. The objectives of dispatching more forces to Somalia was: to protect US forces and bases, to pressure those who would attack the supply routes for US forces. The purpose of this new policy was not anymore “to rebuild Somalia’s society”. The four objectives were mostly accomplished and the US military presence declined sharply until March 31, 1994. (Haass).

That is to say that, Clinton encouraged the development of a United Nations swift deployment force that would be gladly available to address world crises. However, as with any new president, there was still hesitation about how Clinton would conduct foreign policy once in the White House. Much hesitation also remained regarding the extent to which Congress would seek to influence or shape foreign policy in the post–cold war era. The role of Congress is to be observed in the next section, but before addressing how United Nation Peace Enforcement evolved in 1993, it would be worth considering why the stationing of 30,000 troops in the region gained two-party support. Even Congressman. John Lewis, opposer of a military use, said, “It would seem somewhat out of the ordinary for me to support a military effort, but... there are no other affirmative means to alleviate the situation” (R. C. Hendrickson 120).

### **2.1.1 The Role of Congress**

Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress and the President. Among other related contributions, Congress has the power to declare war and increase and support the armed forces. Bill Clinton was the Democrat’s first president in twelve years, and he was in the first year of his presidency when the crisis developed. As a result, to that The Democrats in particular chose to grant Clinton sizable freedom in UNITAF

and UNOSOM II until American losses served as the catalyst for Congress's claim of war power. By October 1993, the mission was a profound embarrassment for the United States. Any account for President Bush's decision to intervene must also account for the failure to take meaningful action to stop the atrocities occurring at the same time in Bosnia. Both Clinton and Congress supported Operation Restore Hope when President Bush initiated the mission.

President Bush was keen to accept the risks and costs of intervention in Somalia but not in Bosnia. In a discussion about American national interests, Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger defended the decision to intervene in Somalia:

...this debate is around this issue of our national interest and that's a legitimate issue, but the fact of the matter is that a thousand people are starving to death every day, that this is not going to get better if we don't do something about it, and it is in an area where we can, in fact, affect events. There are other parts of the world where things are equally tragic, but where the cost of trying to change things would be monumental – in my view, Bosnia is one of those (Eagleburger).

As Clinton took office, some in the Senate stated constitutional worries regarding the mission. According to Congressional Record of 1993, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell expressed his uncertainties concerning the president's constitutional authority to involve U.S. troops in Operation Restore Hope. Mitchell stated that Congress did have a role in peacekeeping decisions and that Congress had a duty to check the president when he deploys troops under a UN authorization. In his most potent statement, Mitchell reasoned, "UN Security Council resolutions are no substitute for congressional authorization" (P. 2. Volume 139).

In the same way, in an editorial article by Jane Perlez foreign correspondent for The New York Times, stated that by 1991, Somalia crumbled. Clan allegiances were high, armed opposition groups conducted raids on villages, with Barre's leadership, and extensive human rights abuses continued. By the year's end, the country had collapsed into chaos, with no government, no police force, no functioning judicial system, and at least one million exiled persons. An estimation of 30,000 people died during the year as a result of war and famine (Perlez). Likewise, Jennifer Parmelee, wrote, Mohammed Aideed rose to power become one of Somalia's toughest clan leaders, from this chaos a mixture of Somalian nationalism and occasional reference to Islam turn to vicious, Aided were well supplied with left-over weapons from the Cold war era (Parmelee). Most importantly, House Foreign Affairs Chairman Lee Hamilton stated in 1992 that Congress, and by implication the House Foreign Affairs Committee, would play a fundamental role in the deployment of the armies (The New York Times 1992).

As a matter of fact, by mid-1992 tension escalated, and the congress called for humanitarian relief mission. As in Mark R. Amstutz Article" International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics", a group of eighty-eight members of Congress wrote to President George Bush asking that his administration to place its "highest priority" on Somalia. These efforts finally resulted in the Bush administration's support for the UN-supported humanitarian operation, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). In this operation, food and other rations were provided to thousands of Somalis (Amstutz). Furthermore, in a Hearings before the committee on Armed Service United States Senates on February 4, 1993, the Senate agreed to the mission. Where, Senate Joint Resolution (SJR) 45 stated that the mission was "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution (WPR). If aggressions were met, the WPR time instrument would begin and the president would have to turn to Congress for authorization. SJR 45 also

gave U.S. troops the authority to use “all necessary means” to fulfill their humanitarian objectives (103-440).

Equally, Representative Bill Goodling argued, “We are authorizing the deployment of U.S. troops under foreign command. This in itself is a monumental event, unparalleled in our history. I stand in opposition to the resolution before the House today.” (P. 8. Volume 139). Since, the defining moment for President Clinton and the mission in Somalia came on June 10, 1993, with his official notification letter to congressional leaders about the mission in Somalia. Clinton noted the United Nations Security Council’s choice to transfer control of the operational duties of the Somalia mission to the United Nations under UNOSOM II. Clinton noted that he had checked closely with Congress and would continue to do so and that the deployment was constitutional under his power as commander in (B. Clinton).

Ultimately, as this chapter inspects the influence of Congress on the Clinton administration's approach to a better US involvement in UN peace-enforcement (UNPE), it is essential to shed light in UNPE’s origins and preserve its integrity as a foreign policy means. In outlining its origins, the chapter explains how in the late 1980s the UN both expanded the number and type of missions it took on. Also, citing President George H. W. Bush's ‘new world order’ (NWO) speeches. In placing UNPE in historical context, it is argued that the belief that mass human rights abuses are a menace to peace and solidity was an extension of cold war principles. Forming alliances to check the spread of uncertainty is similar to the five-decade effort to contain communism.

### **2.1.2 Somalia and UNPE Policy**

Accepting UN peace enforcement as an approach to conflict resolution was first proposed after Desert Storm Iraq in 1991 and debatably ended with IFOR in 1995 Bosnia. The UN's function for humanitarian resolutions differentiate this approach from other eras in US foreign policy. The US has been linked in some manner with the UN, global human rights,

promotion of democracy, so it would be false to show United Nations Peace-Enforcement Operations (UNPE) as an entirely new policy experiment. The US has upheld a role in UN conflict resolution since 1995. UNPE, like the League of Nations, embodied the idea that violence is a crime against humanity in which every state has an 'interest, right and duty' to prevent. Clinton was left with a policy failure in an area in which he dreadfully needed to establish credibility. In addition to the disaster in Mogadishu, that damaged the UN.

Primarily, as Gearoid O Tuathai in his "The Politics of Writing Global Space" book, stated that United Nations Peace-Enforcement Operations was an extension of the early cold war belief that America should control other states behavior. As well as, preventing human rights exploitations for communist containment. Bush did deject contrasts with cold war containment, stating, "we and our European allies have moved beyond containment to a policy of active engagement in a world no longer driven by cold war tensions and animosities". That said, there is evidence that President Bush was thinking in traditional cold war (Tuathai 151).

By the same token, most were highly disapproving of the Clinton administration's handling of the crisis. That is to say, allowing US forces to be drawn into the civil war in Somalia, and changing the mission for humanitarian relief to nation-building. An American journalist and historian David Halberstam, for instance, detailed that senior officials were confused. For this reason, He argued that, Bush's decision was a response to pressure from humanitarians to dispatch troops. The latter, sought to persuade the Clinton to send a force to either Somalia or Bosnia. As Somalia was thought the safer option, it was preferred, but Congress was barely mentioned. (LaFeber) Clinton inner circle considered staying in the region, the reply was to get out of Somalia.

Otherwise, it is not so much about whether Congress forced Clinton to end the mission, but about future deployment policy. Originally, UNITAF's intention would confirm



that the UNPE method was part of conflict resolution strategy. In that case, George Stephanopoulos an American television host, political reporter, noted in his book "All Too Humans: A Political Education", U.S troops would be sent to Somalia in a forceful way, establish peace, and then leave the UN to continue the mission. Although UNITAF was intended as a new age of humanitarian activity, the 1993 reaction to the Somali crisis showed that congressional support for prioritising human rights and pursuing assailants was conditional on the US obligation being light. (Stephanopoulos 151) To illustrate; arguably, the administration's humanitarian policy was damaged by the congressional hostility. Thus, many saw the crisis in Somalia as the UNPE's commemoration. Also, many lawmakers also blamed the United Nations for operational failures.

Overall, Somalia represented confusion and a lack of political will. For example, Clinton's speech telling the UN to learn to say "no", it was a week before the Administration talking publicly about restricting in America's commitment to UNPE. However, it was stressed by the administration that UN peace-enforcement would continue as a feature of foreign policy. Despite minor criticism, congressional support for the mission remained stable throughout the final days of the Bush presidency. there were no US fatalities averted, order was restored, and A full-scale famine had been prevented. Whereas, these were the golden days. The new Clinton's administration decisive letdown to prevent the US from getting drawn into Somalia's civil war did much to unravel earlier successes.

## **2.2 Clinton and Somalia**

As President Clinton came into office, violence between rival clans Spiked. It appears that this smaller military intervention was on its way to becoming a much larger endeavor, Clinton praised the deployment of troops, in which the UN legitimated through Security Council Resolution 814 as a "historic step". Nevertheless, a perception was also growing that Clinton would allow the UN to make decisions rather than assume the lead

himself. Due to unease with the probability of an unrestricted obligation with unclear objectives, the situation in Somalia will be examined in order to determine why the Clinton administration supported consequent UN resolutions that governed the situation on the ground in Somalia.

Initially, Clinton, and Committee of foreign affairs used legislation-Joint Resolution (S.J. Res. 45) to Authorized U.S. troops in Somalia to offer logistical support to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force and use military force if necessary, in order to maintain a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. To put it in another way, it was approved 23-18 in the Foreign Affairs Committee. But was not a mandate for Resolution 814's broader objectives. (United States) Moreover, Clinton had gone much further than Bush's plan to restore order and deliver food, and, above all, there was no doubt that UNSC Resolution 814 was a run of UN attacks involving US troops on the Somalia National Alliance (SNA). As a matter of fact, the press began to be hostile. The Washington Post, for example, reported that the administration was worried that the rising deaths would make it difficult to appropriate funding to continue the mission. Nevertheless, the Clinton team pushed the UNSC to adopt Resolution 865 (Washingtonpost 1994).

Besides, the disaster in Mogadishu incited severe criticism of the administration. When eighteen US Rangers were killed while attempting to capture an SNA command post in Mogadishu on October 3, moves towards deserting the mission began immediately. on October 7, Clinton pledged in a televised address, to recall the troops, and assured Americans that for the remainder of the mission there would be a withdrawal from nation-building, street patrols and efforts to arrest Aidid:

Today I want to talk with you about our Nation's military involvement in Somalia. A year ago, we all watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands, our consciences said, enough. In

our Nation's best tradition, we took action with bipartisan support. President Bush sent in 28,000 American troops as part of a United Nations humanitarian mission. This past week's events make it clear that even as we prepare to withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there. We need more armor, more air power, to ensure that our people are safe and that we can do our job. Today I have ordered 1,700 additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to Somalia to protect our troops and to complete our mission, they are there to keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people, not to personalize the conflict but to prevent a return to anarchy. (W. J. Clinton)

Altogether, both the Bush and Clinton administrations in Somalia operations would not have occurred had the UN not approved the act. When Clinton entered office, he kept the mission as solely "humanitarian." However, in March 1993 the administration supported a resolution introduced into the U.N. Security Council to continue with the humanitarian operation. Bush, and later Clinton indicated to a wider role in UNPE operations. In the second section, UNSC resolutions, will be argued of how the US military would be deployed to check violence and establish norms of international behaviour in the post-cold war world.

### **2.2.1 Security Council Resolution**

While Somalia remained a contested area, The Security Council voted to support Operation Restore Hope; this confirms that the intervention had both international support and legitimacy. With U.S. support, the UN passed two resolutions; the first, Resolution 814, and Resolution 837. Through the use of the variables laid forth in the introduction. The UN Security Council's subsequent decision to call for the capture of General Aideed, the situation in Somalia will be analyzed in order to determine why the Bush and Clinton

administrations supported subsequent UN resolutions that governed the situation on the ground in Somalia.

Notably, according to the United Nations Security Council database, documented under chapter-5, stating that, Resolution 814, was passed in March and established a quick reaction force QRF of eight thousand U.S. logistics personnel, it recognized the need to transit from Bush's operation UNITAF to the expanded UN operation in Somalia UNOSOM. Consequently, the mission in Somalia turned from a "humanitarian mission" to "a nation-building" (814). Transitionally, weeks after the passing of Resolution 814, General Aideed's forces made their presence known in several attacks throughout Mogadishu. On 5 June, 24 Pakistani Peacekeeping from UNOSOM were killed. As a consequence, The UN Security Council passed Resolution 837 authorizing to take all needed procedures against all those responsible for the armed attack. Now, the US-UN forces had done more than nation building, they were leading combat operations. On the subject, the two Resolutions, according to John Robert Bolton marked a careful experiment in "assertive humanitarianism" (Bolton).

Furthermore, the humanitarian operation which became a military intervention had now been changed into an incident with a level of cruelty which neither the Bush administration which began Operation Restore Hope nor the Clinton administration which continued it had anticipated. In fact, Part of "staying the course" required the passing of yet another UN resolution on September 22, 1993 Resolution 865 was passed to lengthen the UN stay into 1995 so that the UN peacekeeping force, amplified by the necessary military personnel. As Dr. Richard W. Stewart, Chief of the Histories Division and a veteran of Somalia. Known for his "American Military History" book, he explained that, part of the QRF authorized by Resolution 814, had the task of conducting several raids throughout Mogadishu which they accomplished through quick insertion by helicopter. Particularly, they

were tasked with the goal of finding Aideed. Plus, the mission quickly went from what should have been a successful raid to a rescue mission. When, they faced a series of setbacks almost nearly when a soldier fell out of a helicopter and had to be evacuated from the area (Stewart 454).

Nonetheless, President Clinton's immediate reaction was to order more troops there to suppress the violence and strengthen the military personnel already there to allow U.S. personnel to be evacuated. Because of the fact, that Support for UNOSOM II within the U.S. became virtually nonexistent as Senator Bob Dole was quoted in Thomas L. Friedman article the author of "From Beirut to Jerusalem", as saying "If we had a vote today, we'd be out today" (Friedman). Consequently, within six months of the Battle of Mogadishu (as it became known), U.S. forces withdrew from Somalia.

In the end, March 31, 1994. was precisely one year after the original U.S. withdrawal had been planned for. For the reason that, President Clinton had the agenda for the complete turnover of the UNOSOM II mission moved to a much earlier date than Resolution 865 had called for. Provided that, Clinton's Administration found its own areas of interest dictating renewed support for ambitious UN operations. International instability and international politics inevitably drew the United Nations back into challenging peace. Not only, in Somalia, Bosnia as well. So, a host of aspects joint to move the United States away from its adopted goal of enhancing UN peacekeeping. These include Administration political priorities and calculations. As stated in chapter one, there is especially one prominent feature one can find when studying humanitarian interventions, like the New World Order, that is the supposed "non-existence" of national interests in conducting a humanitarian intervention on behalf of the intervening parties, the section below will explore the reactions which surfaced as President Clinton chose to join America's NATO allies in conducting a humanitarian intervention.

### **2.2.2 National Interest**

classical interventions usually are based on a perceived national interest (political motifs, resource availability, responding aggression/attacks etc.) it is not necessary to have any national interest in order to conduct humanitarian interventions other than a willingness to prevent or stop human suffering and human rights violations. So much, one designed to keep opposing factions apart so a nation's social fabric can heal, with bloodshed suppressed. Peacekeeping, whether in Haiti, Somalia or Bosnia, has become a high-profile activity, whose efficiency may be disputed. It is one thing. For the Clinton administration, the definition of national interest included the spreading democratic agenda. The most real way for the U.S. to carry out this essence of foreign policy was through joint collaboration. Applying Clinton's ideals to foreign policy, policymakers portrayed a joint intervention in the Balkans as national interest because such action would spread Western values and result in a more stable region. In contrast, Kosovo was a geostrategic location nestled near U.S. European allies and just beyond prior Soviet satellite state.

To start with, Marie-Janine Calic a German historian, political. pointed out that Yugoslavia has always suffered from powerful Albanian and Serbian nationalist, but the rise of Serbian strongman, Milosevic, irritated the situation. He recalled Kosovo's previously granted self-rule in 1989 further isolating 90% of the ethnic Albanian population residing there. Albanians living in Kosovo sought self-determination, and they created their own institutions. Tensions in Kosovo continued to irritate throughout the 1990s, while Milosevic waged war over the Yugoslav province of Bosnia (Calic). In any case, Gilford John Ikenberry a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, Ikenberry said, the meaning of national interest for Clinton included the spreading liberal values. With this fact in mind, stability in Rwanda would have had slight impact on U.S. national interest. In

contrast, Kosovo was a geostrategic location settled near U.S. European allies and just beyond prior Soviet satellite states (Ikenberry 15).

Furthermore, the scarce response to humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Bosnia, and the Srebrenica massacre earlier in the decade also motivated the thought process regarding Kosovo. Samantha Jane Power an American author, she highlighted in her book “A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide“, that both Clinton and Madeline Albright felt blame over indecision in Rwanda and feared another Srebrenica if ethnic cleansing in Kosovo continued unchecked (Power 477). Even more, she further argued that, the U.S. leadership came under scrutiny in 1995 for failure to avert mass killing at Srebrenica. European leaders, members of Congress, the media, and the public disapproved by the passive engagement of the U.S. in Bosnia. (436-37) By the same token, Samantha power concluded that, France and London both clarified that the U.S. was failing in its role as the leader of NATO. when in fact; Rwanda, the implications of inaction in Srebrenica were felt by the Clinton administration. Within the administration, the “institutional memory” of Bosnia was new and tainted by dealings with Milosevic. (449)

Altogether, Clinton’s engagement in a second humanitarian interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be further assessed through a case study in chapter three. However, one can argue that humanitarian interventions have not been a prominent feature of American foreign policy until the end of the Cold War. Moreover, what becomes evident above is that Clinton was able to wage war in Somalia over executive orders due to the ability and willingness of Congress to apply their legislative powers to withhold appropriate funds as granted in the U.S. Constitution. Thus, this chapter considers, the US involvement in Somalia between 1992-93. Given these points, what impact this had on long-term involvement in UNPE operations. Further one can argue from the last discussion above, that by ratifying the intervention and save the people, the U.S. government made it their legal duty to conduct

humanitarian interventions in the face of genocide or other crucial violations to human rights, along with the other signatory parties. Following this logic, humanitarian interventions should be perceived as wars of necessity.



### **Chapter Three: President Clinton's Leadership on Foreign Policies Issues in Bosnia**

The concept of employing US military power to help failing states had lost much of its immediacy by mid-decade. The Somalia crisis had been a defeat for an America still high on the success of the Gulf War. The affiliated chaos put UNPE under threat, but from the congressional viewpoint, withdrawing from Somalia had relieved many worries about entanglement in UN operations. At the same time, pressure to intervene in Bosnia was growing. Even though fighting in the Balkans started in June 1991, due to the belief that it was a problem for the European powers to solve, the first part of this chapter looks at the war in the Balkans explaining the Yugoslav crisis began in June 1991. The chapter then shifts attention to the main topic of analysis: the war in Bosnia. It explains that 1995 debates with the administration regarding the one-sided lifting of the UN-imposed Balkans arms embargo reveal much about attitudes towards a humanitarian foreign policy. Finally, analysis of the debates leading to the IFOR troop deployment in Bosnia and continued until the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995. Through a combination of the periodic and complex nature of the violence.

#### **3.1 Background to the Yugoslav Crisis**

It would be irresponsible to look at the Bosnian War in a void. Many believe centuries-old episodes of hatred and subjugation had aftermaths that have resonated throughout the history of the region, the most recent round of tensions in the Balkans is easily misunderstood without historical context. And that the Bosnian War Signified the most recent chapter in an age-old cycle of violence. Often ignored are long periods (sometimes Even centuries) of peaceful coexistence among the Balkan peoples, where they interacted, lived, and worked together in calmness. Nevertheless, these periods of war and peace created a complex religious, ethnic, and nationalist history, that would mean any intervention to stop

the fighting could have had both geopolitical and historical consequences. Josip Broz Tito founded the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of six republics- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) in 1945. A thorough dissection of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is beyond the realms of this chapter. Focusing on 1995 is appropriate because it includes the events arguably most revealing to a study of foreign policy making. Before looking at the conflict's final stages, it would be worth briefly documenting events prior to 1995.

Specifically, after World War II Josip Broz Tito emerged, and founded the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of six republics- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) in 1945. John G. Stoessinger, a prominent scholar of world politics who is currently Distinguished Professor of Global Diplomacy at the university of San Diego. His books have often been assigned as text courses on world politics. In his book "Why Nations Go to War", he described Tito as a Charismatic communist leader and resistance leader.

Most importantly, Josip "Tito" Broz Assumed power in Yugoslavia. As president, and virtual dictator, Tito Was able to subdue the ethnic, religious, and nationalist tensions in his country. His Answer to these conflicts was simple: Loyalty to Tito And Yugoslavia Was all that mattered. He Adopted the motto, "Brotherhood and Unity" As he suppressed nationalism with an iron fist; loyalty to any other cause, was punishable with prison, exile, or even execution. (Stoessinger) Tito's Death in 1980 marked the beginning of Yugoslavia's collapse. Urged Along by the collapse of the Iron Curtain, from 1989 to 1991, The regime crumbled and the central government lost power and influence, giving the republics plenty reason to break away to form their own nations.

By this time, as Stoessinger further explained, Serbian Leader Slobodan Milosevic Exploited and fuel the growing surge of Serbian Nationalism in route to becoming the most

powerful political figure in Yugoslavia. That being the case, The Serbs, who had controlled much of the arsenal of the former Yugoslav army, began a campaign of organized murder, rape, and torture against their former Croat And Muslim Neighbors in an effort to form “ethnically pure” Serb Governments in Croatia And Bosnia (Why Nations Go to War 138). Thus, this exercise stimulated ethnic nationalism and led to calls for increased decentralisation.

Subsequently, On March 3, 1992, Bosnia Declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Most Bosnian Serbs Refused the new Bosnian government, choosing instead to take up arms. Violence Exploded instantly, and by late March 1992, the streets of many Bosnian Cities were plagued with open war. Considering, Bosnian Serbs Initiated the fighting, but it quickly grew into a complicated three-way territorial war among the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, And Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). Even though, as Kaplan argued that at the outbreak of the fighting, turned to the region’s deep past and asserted that its future was hopeless to founder on the rocks of centuries of ethnic and religious hatred. Serbs, Croats, And Bosniaks Have been fighting for so long, and that hate is so ingrained into their culture, that they will continue to propagate violence toward one another (R. Kaplan).

Likewise, Croatia declared independence from the federation. In July 1991, hostility started in Croatia between Croats and the local Serb minority. In addition to defending Serbs, the Yugoslav National Army began seizing areas in which Croats were the majority. To illustrate, the UN's reaction to the Bosnian crisis was much the same as for the rest of the Balkans. According to the UN security resolution 757, issued by the Congress in 1992, 7,000 international troops were deployed as part of UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force). The purpose of UNPROFOR was to distribute humanitarian supplies (757). Furthermore, mostly Areas where ethnic Serbs Made up the majority of the population. Yugoslav Aircraft bombed the Croatian Government headquarters in Zagreb as ground forces moved to within 10 Miles

of the Croatian capital. Croatia Responded by severing all ties with Yugoslavia and a brutal war ensued. Therefore, as stated on the document, the U.N. Security Council decided in resolution 713 asserted, to imposed an arms embargo, in a decision that would cause considerable tension between Congress and the Clinton administration, to restrict the ability of the warring parties to escalate the violence (713).

Consequently, the above has outlined the main a background to the Yugoslav crises. Part two will now link that discussion to the theme raised in chapter three, then applies the Bosnia case to analysis. Anyway, the Wave of civilian massacres occurred in the shadow of the “Hour of Europe”, at a time when the great powers hoped such atrocities were a thing of the past. While the Americans and Europeans Agreed that the ferocity needed to stop, a military intervention would have to be handled carefully, sixty percent of Bosnian territory was occupied by Serbian nationalists, who raped, displaced, or murdered thousands of Muslims and Croats. The war posed a threat to the stability of Europe. Thus, Bosnia Constituted the most glaring issue preventing the implementation of Clinton’s Vision for success within the “New Atlantic Community”.

### **3.1.1 The Bosnian War**

As Noted, before, Tito’s Death in 1980 marked the beginning of Yugoslavia’s downfall. From 1989 To 1991, Communism collapsed and the central government lost power and influence giving, the republics full reason to break away to form their own nations. In June 1991, the republics of Slovenia And Croatia Declared their independence from Yugoslavia. Although banned by Serbs, Muslims and Croats voted for independence for Bosnia in a March 1992 survey. The subsequent declaration of independence provoked fighting between Bosnian government forces and the Serb minority.

Coincidentally, Returning to the subject, the database of Bosnian community in St. Louis. Showed that, how encouraged by the actions of their neighbors, Bosnia Declared its

independence from Yugoslavia In March 1992. In response, most Bosnian Serbs Chose to take up arms rather than join in the political process. By Late March, the streets of many Bosnian Cities were plagued with confrontations. The U.S. And European Community Officially recognized Bosnia's Independence in April 1992 (Louis). With this fact in mind, the ethnic Serbs, backed by Yugoslav forces, not only took their fight to the Bosnian Government army, but also turned on the non-Serb citizens of Bosnia and Began a campaign of ethnic cleansing in an effort to create a "pure" Bosnian Serb State Bosnian President Izetbegovic Asked the U.N. Security Council to intervene, but they declined to send peacekeepers.

Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs escalated their campaign of violence all across the country. Plus, as scholars Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup showed, that Bosnian Serbs shelling of Sarajevo intensified. The increase of violence had captured the world's attention, and the international community-initiated efforts to reopen the airport in Sarajevo for humanitarian relief flights. Accordingly, the U.N. Security Council Agreed to send 1,500 Peacekeepers from their Protection Force (UNPROFOR) To secure the Sarajevo airport, that have been attacked by Yugoslavian and Bosnian Serb forces and managed to kidnap President Izetbegovic, after He had returned from negotiations in Lisbon. The Yugoslavians Used Izetbegovic as leverage to guarantee their safe exit from Sarajevo (Stephen and Paul 129-131). Because of this, the U.N. Authorized its member to take "all Measures necessary" to support in the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia, and by August, had authorized the use of force to protect aid convoys (Resolution).

In a memorandum from Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to President Clinton, Lake Stated that Clinton's Foreign policy team was considering how the U.S. Would increase its longer-term goal in the humanitarian effort. In fact, Lake wrote, "we Should try to use this action as leverage with the parties on the ground to cease interference with relief

convoys and relief agencies (And their UNPROFOR escorts) to be more assertive in getting the convoys through” (Lake). Significantly, after Bosnian Serb Forces denied passage of aid convoys to besieged areas. President Clinton determined to step up American effort toward peace in Bosnian, by authorizing the aerial delivery of relief supplies to Bosnian Muslims In February 1993 (W. J. Clinton). Besides, the author of several books on the former Yugoslavia, among them *The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes*, James Gow, noted that, Clinton’s Administration encouraged the U.N. to tighten the sanctions on Serbia and proposed a “lift and strike” policy toward the Bosnian Serbs. So that Clinton had campaigned on this policy during the 1992 election, and now he was proposing “lift and strike” as a workable policy in Bosnia (James Gow 178-179).

Subsequently, the Second half of 1993 saw a rise of violence by Bosnian Croats. In addition, Bosnian Croats Fire upon U.N. Forces before allowing them to enter the town of Stupni Do, that witnessed massacre of Bosnian Muslims. Provided that, many scholars expressed their positive stance regarding Bosnia, among them Clark, Arthur L, whom argued in his book “Bosnia: what every American should know “, that in response to the massacre, U.S. And France initiative to threatened the Bosnian Serbs with airstrikes if the Serbs Did not remove their heavy weapons from the vicinity of Sarajevo. Russia Intervened to ensure the Bosnian Serbs complied. Later That month, NATO Shot down 4 Bosnian Serb Aircraft for violating the U.N. no fly zone. Moreover, Russia Criticized the Bosnian Serb Aggression and NATO Responded with more airstrikes, forcing Bosnian Serb Forces to withdraw from Gorozde Town that, fell under Bosnian Serb control (Arthur 106-107).

Equally, as mentioned in the publication by Political and Social Affairs Division explaining, the U.S., Britain, Germany, France, And Russia Formed a “contact group” and proposed a new peace plan in July. The Five Powers Peace Plan Was based on a territorial division of Bosnia Where the Bosnia Croats And Muslims Would control 51% Of the country,

while Bosnian Serbs would control the remaining 49% (Rigby). Furthermore, the contact group threatened to multilaterally lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government if the Bosnian Serbs Rejected the plan. Notably, Author: Noel Malcolm has undertaken the task to write a political and social history of Bosnia. Malcolm seeks to clarify the competing myths of the racial, religious and political history put forth by each side in the conflict. In his introduction, Malcolm wrote:

the war...has added two melancholy reasons for examining its history more closely: the first is the need to understand the origins of the fighting and the second is the need to dispel some of the clouds of misunderstanding, deliberate myth-making, and sheer ignorance in which all discussion of Bosnia and its history had become shrouded. ( Malcolm 258-259)

Altogether, the above has outlined the main points of Bosnian war. Clinton gave a concrete detail about the scope of American leadership in the Bosnian peace process: “America’s role will not be about fighting a war. It will be about helping the people of Bosnia to secure their own peace agreement” (Albright 15). As discussed in earlier chapter, failure in Somalia led to severely restricting U.S. involvement in conflicts abroad. Inaction was also an issue as the nationalist president Slobodan Milosevic started his campaign to create a “Greater Serbia”, uniting the Serb populated areas of the former Yugoslavia crossing the borders of Bosnia, Montenegro and Croatia, targeting Bosnian Muslims for expulsion and eventually genocide. Since, the widespread dislike of Bush’s relative silence toward Bosnia was severely attacked by Clinton, who made campaign promises to swiftly address the terrible human rights abuses occurring there if he took office. as the newly elected President, began his term in 1993 just as things were getting particularly rough for Bosnia’s Muslims. How was it possible for a new leader, who claimed he would solve the Bosnian crisis, to get away with equivocating a human rights disaster that international law states to prevent.?

### 3.2 Clinton's Intervention in Bosnia

“You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Athenians to the people of Milos, 416 B.C

The above logic of the Athenians has reigned supreme in international affairs; if you have something I want and I am strong enough to take it, then I will; if you get in my way, then I will remove you. People who have not had the military or technological strength to resist other countries and their peoples have experienced the most nightmarish things simply because someone was able to do whatever they wanted to get what they wanted. As mentioned in previous chapter, Clinton had kept his promise to take a more aggressive position than the U.S. had previously taken. Not only, ensuring stability and spreading democracy were central to Clinton's vision. He Sought to enhance the security of all European states, but also, After the election, Clinton Continued his emphasis on a stronger U.S. role in the Balkans. In Dec 1992, he publicly stated, “Anything we can do to try to turn up the heat in Bosnia to try to reduce the carnage is worth trying” (Sciolino, 2019). Furthermore, Clinton concentrated the lion's share of his foreign policy resources on Bosnia, which his team viewed as the most crucial crisis for U.S. Foreign policy. From The very first meeting of the Clinton staff, Bosnia Was their primary foreign policy concern. The violence in Bosnia represented the European instability that Clinton desired to abolish in order to connect in his new vision for the U.S. In the New Atlantic Community.

Soon after being elected, in a news conference on March 9, 1993, Clinton discussed his meeting with the French President at the time, François Mitterrand, and the values of the meeting for policy towards Bosnia. Clinton remained vague when discussing Bosnia throughout the news conference, making comments such as the following: “Let me say that I have been very pleased with the comments that he (Mitterrand) has made today and with the



possibilities that we might have toward working together to secure a peace in Bosnia” (Clinton 257). Particularly, in February 1993 prior to the press conference and, less than a month after taking office Clinton Reasserted his commitment to U.S. Involvement in the Balkans. He Stated that the U.S. Needed to take a bolder stance against Serbian aggression. Specifically, Clinton said, “We've Got to get the heavy weapons out of utilization...we've got to toughen the embargo against The Serbs. We Ought to open a United Nations war crimes inquiry, and we ought to enforce the no-fly zone against Serbian aircraft, strongly” (Peters).

Moreover, fixated on containing the conflict and hoping for a diplomatic settlement, according to Presidential Documents, Clinton’s initial response was to stand by former President Bush’s policy of keeping up the 1991 arms embargo implemented, by the UN Security Council over all former Yugoslavian territories. He further supplemented Bush’s arms embargo by issuing Executive Order 12846 Additional measures with respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Serbia and Montenegro, in late April 1993 (Executive Order 12846 Vol. 58). Above all, the general sentiment in Washington was, as Bush’s secretary of state James Baker stated so explicitly, that the United States had “no dog in that fight” (Michael 01). With no national interest in the Balkans, the best course was perceived as staying clear of intervention.

However, the significance of the situation growing in the Balkans eventually led Clinton to acknowledge that the U.S. might indeed have “clear interests” in the East European region. As U.S politics John Dumbrell noted in his book “Clinton’s Foreign Policy “, the U.S. had an interest in both preventing the war from spreading through the European continent, making the war come to an end, and preserving NATO’s credibility as a coalition to be reckoned with in the post-Cold War world. In addition, there was as Clinton stated “the humanitarian interest we all share” (Dumbrell 85). By the same token, facing what the administration referred to as “ethnic cleansing”, while avoiding the definition “genocide” with

the moral implications connected to its use. Dumbrell further asserted that, Clinton eventually permitted American led airstrikes by NATO against Serb positions starting in February 1994. Determined not to deploy American forces on the ground, Clinton stuck to airstrikes, which eventually paid off as the aggressive attacks and hostilities between the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims wore off by the fall of 1994. Clinton implemented further economic sanctions through Executive Order 12934 Blocking property and additional measures with respect to the Bosnian Serb-controlled areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1994 (83- 85).

However, the spring of 1995 saw the revival of the fighting between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Despite increased pressure from Congress Clinton kept his resistance towards the arms embargo. NATO air strikes were again launched in order to stop the fighting. Still Clinton's greatest concern was to keep American troops off the ground in Bosnia. As late as 23 May, with Serb attacks on Bosnian Muslims increasing in brutality and UN officials taken hostage, the only clearly agreed position from a UN principals meeting "seemed to be that US troops should not be deployed" (85). As Milosevic's forces were closing in on the "safe" areas established by UNPROFOR in Srebrenica Clinton was taking the heat. He expressed concern over the diminishing credibility of US foreign policy and the credibility of the NATO alliance in the post-Cold War world. Facing the possible retreat of European UN forces, Clinton was unwilling to lift the embargo or deploy American ground troops. Consequently, the administration appeared to be "flapping around" with an inconsistent policy on how to handle the escalating crisis (86).

Eventually, in August 1995, the U.S. in collaboration with NATO launched a three-week bombing campaign against Serb targets. The massacres were finally put to an end and the war was concluded with the signing of the Dayton Agreement. On November 21, a peace deal was reached in Dayton that would preserve Bosnia as

a single state with a Muslim-Croat federation and a Bosnian Serb Republic. The deal, though, required an international force to police it. To secure implementation, the US would contribute troops to the International Implementation Force (IFOR). The NATO deployment was a peacekeeping mission that resembled Chapter Six of the UN Charter: it was not intended to entail peace-building and was expected to last one year. The chapter shifts attention to the process leading to the IFOR troop deployment.

### **3.2.1 Operation Deliberate Force**

It would be misleading to describe the debate surrounding the use of force in Bosnia as one of an interventionist president and an isolationist Congress. There was diversity within the new administration, and even congressional Republicans were hardly of one mind on the issue, but neither branch was seeking to install pre-settlement troops, to understand United States and Western policy in Bosnia Herzegovina and the surrounding states in general, and Operation Deliberate Force in particular, one must place these policies in strategic context. The sequence of events that led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign of

August and September 1995 did not really begin in the fourteenth century, as some writers have suggested, but it does precede the breakup of Yugoslavia and the civil war in Bosnia that began in 1992. It was apparent by 1995 that the violence could not be checked without US action.

Despite Clinton's desire to keep US troops out of Bosnia, it was superficial that in 1995 the UN mission was not working well. After Months of intense negotiations, Executive Vice President and Senior Advisor Derek Chollet asserted that, President Clinton's Team and the leaders of the Bosnian combatant reached a tentative agreement on peace in Bosnia. By The end of October 1995, all sides agreed to meet in Dayton, Ohio to discuss an end to the fighting. Clinton's Bosnia Team informed the president, "This Is the best chance we've had

for peace since the war began” (Chollet 132) .He further assessed, President Clinton Briefed the press on October 31, 1995 And said, “It May be the last chance we have for a very long time”. Twenty-One days of emotional negotiations in Dayton Left the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, And Muslims Reaching an acceptable peace agreement (180-181).

Therefore, On November 21, a peace deal was reached in Dayton that would preserve Bosnia as a single state with a Muslim-Croat federation and a Bosnian Serb Republic. The deal, though, required an international force to police it. To secure implementation, the US would contribute troops to the International Implementation Force (IFOR). Three Weeks later 20,000 Americans Formed part of a 60,000 Strong NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) That arrived in Bosnia to ensure that the Dayton Peace Accords Were enforced by all sides. U.S. Military participation in IFOR Proved vital. Had the American’s Left the implementation up to the Europeans, The Dayton Agreement could have ended in changed violence, similar to the former peace plans employed by the U.N. And the European Public. Instead, the region continued to enjoy peace a decade after the last American Combat forces left Bosnia. Thus, Deliberate Force provided a unique challenge for campaign planners, especially those nurtured in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) environment. Since the founding of the alliance, it had focused on largescale, conventional war.

### **3.2.2 Winning the American Public support and the Dayton Peace Accords**

Even from beyond the grave, there are victims singing the song of peace today. May their voices be in our minds and our hearts forever.

President Clinton

Arguably, the Dayton Peace Accords met the initial intent. They provided the structure for ending the bloody conflict and stopping ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The weightiness of the massacre at Srebrenica For Clinton’s Vision for the post-Cold War World cannot be overstated. The Massacre provided Clinton with the ability to

instantaneously destroy the barriers to his vision of a new post-Cold War Human rights regime and of Euro-American Guaranteed stability. Srebrenica Proved that the European Union Was incapable of handling the Bosnian War Without the military might and international influence of the United States. It Demonstrated to the world, the need for the U.S. To take the lead and offered the Clinton Administration valuable leverage with their European allies. Even Yeltsin Could not defend the Bosnian Serb Actions after Srebrenica. Most importantly, Srebrenica Made the American Public pay attention. They Began to view the Bosnian War as an American problem; they lost faith in the UN And European Union's Ability to end the war, and U.S. Intervention became a genuine option.

Clinton as stated in CIA documents (Center Intelligence Agency), Recognized the tragedy of the event, but also its utility. More importantly, he took advantage. Armed With this leverage over the Europeans, Clinton Took the lead in Bosnia. Regardless Of the control the Europeans were willing to grant him, Clinton Convinced the Europeans of his sincerity and of the utility of American Power and influence. Persuading the American Public would prove more difficult. He Went to work immediately convincing the American Public of the need for American Leadership in the Balkans (W. J. Clinton).

Aside From highlighting the illogicality that Bosnia was just A European problem, more importantly, and perhaps surprisingly for Clinton, the war in Bosnia Caught the attention of the American public, and now Srebrenica pushed the Bosnian War onto the headlines of American Media outlets, and the American Public was paying attention. Media Coverage of the Bosnian War increased significantly as the U.S. Became more involved, creating a connection between the American People and what was formerly a European problem.

For example, in 1992, James Sadkovich has compiled a truly masterly assessment of the US media's biased and generally inept, according to his findings in his book "The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995", there were just over 100 Articles about the Balkan Crisis

published in Major American Periodicals In 1995, There were more than 1,000.<sup>205</sup> The Washington Post Published 77 Articles covering the Bosnian War In July 1995, But only nine of those were published before Srebrenica. The Increased U.S. Media coverage of Bosnia After Srebrenica Allowed Clinton to make a case for U.S. Intervention to the American public. The Public responded. Polling Indicated that when the administration took a clear position against Serbian aggression, most Notably, in August One month after Srebrenica. The poll numbers reflected a greater degree of American Support for military action in Bosnia (Sadkovich 117-118).

In the end, Srebrenica proved Clinton's vision for American post-Cold War foreign policy to be the correct one, but Clinton's realization of the opportunity that Srebrenica offered, and his ability to take advantage of the situation allowed for his success in implementing his vision. The Europeans were not ready to handle any major crisis, even one on their own continent. It took Euro-American cooperation to negotiate, implement, and enforce peace in the Balkans. The narrow, Cold-War Views of American Foreign policy were also proven inept. Had Clinton Followed such a vision, Srebrenica Would have forced some kind of action he would have been completely unprepared for. More importantly, it would have forced him to change his paradigm and adopt a wider view of U.S. Foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Finally, Srebrenica Forced an apathetic American Public to see a European Problem as an American one.

### **General Conclusion**

The demise of the Soviet Union, rising ethnic and regional conflict around the globe, and George Bush's use of the term "new world order" set off a classic modern American foreign-policy debate about which of two utopian goals we should stake national security and prosperity on: global stability or the worldwide triumph of democracy. To repeat, with the end

of the Cold War came the end of a relatively stable international order. This end sparked intense debates about the new direction of American foreign policy.

As Bill Clinton took office, he developed a new lexicon of words in order to discuss America's changing role in the world and other major international issues of the time without being able to fall into Cold War-era rhetoric. By examining the shades and unique contributions President Clinton made to American foreign policy rhetoric. Specifically, It may be nearly impossible to prove exactly what motivated Clinton to push for an America Intervention in Bosnia, but his motivation was certainly multi-faceted. It is true that Bosnia represented a weakness in Bush's foreign policy, and Clinton campaigned heavily on it. Regarding, Somalia was not the site of security interests, this was the first primarily humanitarian use of force in modern U.S history.

Intervention in the Bosnian War would ultimately prove to be one of the Clinton administration's boldest and most successful accomplishments. After Combat forces were deployed to enforce the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, Public opinion for the mission climbed. In 1998, Just over two years after the deployment of U.S. Soldiers to Bosnia, The Washington Post Reported that American Public support for the NATO Mission in Bosnia Had "never Been higher." Clinton Would eventually admit that he felt it was a miracle that war had not resumed in Bosnia.

Reflecting Years later on America's Role in stopping the Bosnian War, Clinton Stated "Bosnia in some ways became a metaphor for the struggles of the 21<sup>st</sup> century," as it shaped both his presidency, and his foreign policy going forward. It is true that Clinton's poll numbers were lower before the Dayton Peace Accords than after their implementation, but this does not mean Clinton was only trying to turn around his public image. While Clinton's role in halting Europe's worst atrocities since World War II will certainly be fondly remembered.

Whereas, in assessing the legislature as a foreign policy partner, the role of Congress in the failure of the Clinton administration in Somalia, to commit to a lasting involvement in UN peace enforcement addressed in the case study in congressional support was based on a short-term policing action to prevent a famine, not nation-building. By May 1993, American troops being drawn into the Somali civil war confirmed the perception that many lawmakers had of Clinton as a foreign policy amateur who was sub-letting the US military to the UN.

This concern was reflected in the House's version, which limited the president's ability to deploy troops, and the Senate's requiring the president to gain congressional approval for the continued operation by November 15. The relationship twisted further after the eighteen Rangers were killed in Mogadishu in October 1993. The peace-enforcement action in Somalia demonstrated that American lives were being squandered in a country that the administration had no command over and that the UN had duped the US into a war with Gen. Aidid. Lawmakers felt they had been overly patient with the administration.

To conclude, the post-Cold War World was one of quickly developing challenges for the world's lone superpower. It Was also a period of clashing ideals as the old, narrow vision for the U.S. Was forced to make way for a more incorporating idea for U.S. Foreign policy; in this world. What is certain is Clinton entered office with a very different idea of America's Role in the post-Cold War World than that of his predecessor. Clinton's view was more encompassing view of American foreign policy that placed a higher premium on Euro-American cooperation in the New Atlantic Community. And regarded instability in Europe As an American issue. Clinton charted a new course for American Foreign policy. In an age of increased American power, authority, and responsibility, the Clinton administration made a clear statement that catastrophes such as the Bosnian War were most effectively met with cooperation, and a foreign policy that considered the problems of one's partners as important as their own.



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